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IN THE ,SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM F. SMITH and PATSY
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Pla~ntiffs
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-vs.CARROLL REALTY COMPANY, a
corporation, and NATHANIEL A.
SMITH

Case No.
8892

Defendants and Appellants

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties are referred to as in the court below.
All italics are ours.
This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment
rendered against them and in favor of plaintiffs in the
sum of $4, 850.00.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in defendants' brief is confusing and necessitates a restatement of the evidence.
Plaintiffs are husband and wife. In June of the year
1950, they purchased a home located at 3031 South 8th
East Street, Salt Lake City, rtah. Shortly after the
purchase they listed the hmne for sale with Jackson
Realty Company which later became Carroll Realty
Company. Plaintiffs selected Jackson Realty Company
because their friend, N. A. Smith, was associated with
the company as a real estate agent (R. 99).
No offers to purchase the home were submitted until
early Autumn of 1950. At this time Defendant Smith
presented to plaintiffs a photograph of a home located
at Lava Hot Springs, Idaho. The owner of the home
was Nick Kladis who was interested in exchanging it
for property in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiffs indicated
to Defendant Smith they needed additional information
before considering the transaction. On Decen1ber 8, 1950,
in the con1pany of defendant Smith, plaintiff William
F. Smith went to Lava Hot Springs to see the home.
(R. 104, 134). The parties spent approximately two to
three hours on the premises and returned to Salt Lake
City the same evening (R. 103).
On the return trip the Inerits of the exchange agreeInent were discussed. S1nith stated he was not fmniliar
with the 1narket value of properties in the Lava Hot
Springs area, and agreed to detennine the value of the
Kladis property for plaintiffs. Defendant Sn1ith called
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a Mr. Teeples, the Bishop of the Latter-day Saint Church
at Lava Hot Springs for the purpose of determining the
value of said property (R. 175).
After the trip to Lava Hot Springs offers were submitted to Kladis through his local real estate agent, a
Mr. Baird of Fletcher-Lucas Investment Company. On
January 5, 1951, a meeting of plaintiffs, defendants, Mr.
Baird and Mr. and Mrs. Kladis was held at the office of
Fletcher-Lucas Investment Company in Salt Lake. At
that meeting plaintiff Smith had the following conversation with defendant Smith (R. 107, 108, 109) :
"Q.

When next were you contacted by Mr. Smith,
by the defendant, Nathaniel A. Smith, with
respect to this Kladis property?

A.

Periodically, I kept in touch with Mr. Smith.
However, some time in January, we did meet
at the office of Fletcher-Lucas.

Q. Who was present?
A.

There was Mr. Baird, who was the representative of that firm, Mr. Kladis, Mr. Smith and
myself.

* * *
Q.

At that time did you have any discussion with
Mr. Smith with respect to the property?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a discussion alone, or was somebody else there present?
A.

We had a discussion in a group first, and
then I had a discussion with Mr. Smith privvately.
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Q. What was this discussion privately between
you ancl Mr. Smith~ Relate the conversation.
A. I asked hlm what he had found out in the
interim of time, about the property in Idaho.
Q.

(Mr. Dibblee) What did he say; give us the
conversation.

A.

He said, 'Yes. From all I can determine, it
looks like a good deal to me.'

Q.

Did he say anything with respect to what his
opinion was, as to the value of the property?

A.

He said he thought it looked like it would be
a good deal to him.

Q. In this conversation did he sa~~ anything about
the people he had contacted~
A.

He said he had contacted a reliable source,
and that he could judge that it would be a
good deal.

Q. Did he make any disclosure to you as to what
this reliable source had said'
A. No."
The plaintiff further testified that this conversation was
as follows (R. 116) :
"Q.

Now, when you talked again, did he make any
reference to these investigations 1

A.

He 1nade reference that he had investigated-

Q.

What did he

A.

He said, ·r have 1nade investigations relating
to what you asked me to, and all I can learn
on this, it looks to me like it would be areasonable price to allow for that property at
Lava.'

say~
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Q. What did you say in reply to that

statement~

A.

I said, 'Nate, you know I rely on you- on
your judgment- and, if you say it is okay,
it is okay by me.' "
After completion of the above conversations plaintiffs executed the Exchange Agreement (Exhibit 1). On February 1, 1951, the warranty deeds and mortgages were
executed by the parties (Exhibit 2) and each party took
possession of his respective home.
In August, 1951, plaintiff listed his acquired property
for sale with a real estate agency in Pocatello, Idaho. The
listing price was in the sum of $16,000.00 (R. 112). Plaintiff was unable to sell the home and defaulted on the
mortgage to Mr. Kladis. A foreclosure action was instituted by Kladis and the property sold at a sheriff's sale.
In the latter part of February, 1954, plaintiff Smith
returned to Lava Hot Spring, Idaho, to investigate his
transaction with Kladis. He contacted residents in that
community, including Mr. Teeples (R. 117). Upon completion of this investigation, plaintiffs filed their complaint against defendants.
The theory alleged in plaintiffs' original complaint
was fraud. The complaint was amended to allege as f-t
second cause of action the failure of defendants to exercise the usual and customary skill and diligence of their
profession.
Defendant Smith testified he agreed to determine
the value of the Kladis property. He secured this valuation from Mr. Teeples who was not a real estate agent
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and who was not familiar with the market value of property in Lava Hot Springs. The witness Jensen testified
that this conduct in determining the value of the Kladis
property was not in accordance with the standards of
the profession (R. 165). Defendant Smith testified he
reported to plaintiffs all material information he secured
from Mr. Teeples but this was denied by Plaintiff Smith.
(R. 179, 180).
In view of this evidence plaintiffs withdrew their
first cause of action and submitted the matter to the jury
on the basis of negligence.
The witness Banning, a real estate agent in Pocatello,
and who was familiar with the market values of property
in Lava Hot Springs, Idaho, testified the reasonable value
of the Kladis property as of February 1, 1951, was between the sum of $7,000.00 and $8,000.00 (R. 91). The
defendants' expert witness Sol omen testified the value
of the Smith property on February 1, 1951, was $19,200.00
(R. 227).
The trial court instructed the jury the measure of
damages in this action was the difference between the
reasonable market value of the Kladis property and the
reasonable value of plaintiffs' h01ne. The evidence presented substantiated the verdict in the sun1 of $3,700.00.
The third cause of action concerned the refund of the
real estate commission paid by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs respectfully sub1uit that the case was properly sub1nitted to the jury and the judg1nent should be
affinned by this court.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIRED DEFENDANTS TO DETERMINE VALUES OF THE EXCHANGE
PROPERTIES.
POINT II.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT INVOLVED IN
THIS CASE.
POINT III.
THE DUTY OF DEFENDANTS WAS NOT BASED UPON A VOID CONTRA.CT.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF
RISK.
POINT V.
THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENT DID NOT WAIVE THE
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE
JURY THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE.
POINT VII.
THE PROOF WAS SUFFICIENT AS TO THE PLAINTIFF PATSY SMITH.
POINT VIII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS THE AMOUNT OF REAL ESTATE COMMISSION.
POINT IX.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIRED DEFENDANTS TO DETERMINE VALUES OF THE EXCHANGE
PROPERTIES.

The written agreement required defendants to exercise reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of
their duties as real estate agents and brokers. When the
proposal to exchange plaintiffs' property for the Kladis
property was presented to defendants it was their responsibility to become fully informed about the Kladis property and· particularly to become properly advised as to
the reasonable market value of said property. The expert
witnesses Jensen and Sol omen, both testified that the
standards and custom of the real estate business require
this to be done. (R. 173, 209).
Defendants knew that plaintiffs were relying on them
to ascertain the value of the Kladis property and on the
basis of that value to advise plaintiffs as to whether the
exchange would be beneficial to the1n. This ''"as the sole
reason defendant contacted ~Ir. Teeples.
Defendants now contend that the en1ployn1ent agreement did not require them to ascertain the value of the
Kladis property. The trial court did not give credence to
this rather novel argu1nent and sub1nitted the n1atter to
the jury as an issue of fact.
·under Group 1, Proposition A and B of the Special
Verdict the trial court presented a~ an issue of fact the
scope of defendants' e1nploy1nent. The jury found that
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the scope of defendants' employment agreement did, in
fact, include the duty to determine the reasonable market
value of the Kladis property.
The standards of the real estate profession and the
conduct by defendants substantiated this finding by the
jury.
Under the same group of the Special Verdict the trial
court properly included the duty of defendants to report
the results of their inquiry.
POINT II.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT INVOLVED IN
THIS CASE.

Under Point II of their brief defendants again argue
that the written Sales Agency Contract did not include
the duty of defendants to determine the reasonable value
of the Kladis property, and further that if defendants
did have the duty, this duty was based upon an oral modification of the written agreement. Counsel then cites
authorities that any oral modification is void as being
within the Statute of Frauds.
This same argument was presented to the trial court
in the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
The trial court disposed of this novel contention in his
memorandum decision as follows:
"The defendants claimed that the oral agreement to determine the valuation of the property
was not supported by consideration, and barred by
the Statute of Frauds.
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"The Court tentatively is of the opinion that
such is the fact, but is of the opinion that the agent
was bound by the written agreement of employment to disclose to his principal what he had
learned concerning the value of the property and
that a breach in that respect was a breach of the
written agreement, and on this ground the motions
are denied." (R. 75)
It is a well accepted principle of law that the scope
of employment of a real estate agent encompasses the
duty to disclose pertinent and material facts.
In ReiJch v. Christopulos, 256 P. 2d 238, this court
stated:
"In undertaking the sale of the property for
the Reiches, Hill had a duty to represent their
interest in good faith, to discharge it with reasonable skill and diligence and to disclose to them all
pertinent facts which "\vould materially affect their
interest. As is noted in A1nerican Jurisprudence:
'The faithful discharge of his duties is a
condition precedent to any recovery upon the
part of a broker for the services he has rendered his principal. Thus, he is not entitled
to compensation if he fails to disclose to his
principal any personal lmowledge which he
possesses relative to matters which are or
may be 1naterial to his employer's interests
•

:!It :!It'"

An annotation in
ject as follo,vs:

~32

ALR 2d 728, discusses the sub-

"As pointed out in 8 Aln. Jur. 1038, Brokers,
Sec. 89, the rule requiring a broker to act with the
utinost good faith toward his principal places him
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under a legal obligation to make a full, fair, and
prompt disclosure to his employer of all facts
within his knowledge which are or may be material
to the matter in connection with which he is employed, which might affect his principal's rights
and interest of influence his action in relation to
the subject matter of the employment, or which
in any way pertain to the discharge of the agency
which the broker has undertaken; and it is the
interests of the employer that furnish the criterion
as to what information is material in the sense that
it should be communicated by the broker to his
employer."
It is admitted that Smith orally agreed to determine
the value of the Kladis property and in accordance with
said oral agreement contacted Mr. Teeples and received
valuable information pertaining to the prospective exchange property. The jury found he failed to disclose
this information to the plaintiffs. It is inconceivable that
the Statute of Frauds could be used to relieve the defendants from legal responsibility for their failure to discharge their fiduciary duty of full disclosure. The trial
court correctly ruled the Statute of Frauds has no application.
An interesting case in point is Steiner v. Rowley,
(Cal.) 221 P. 2d 9. This was an action by plaintiffs to
secure the amounts paid as commission and secret profits
to defendants as real estate agents. In count one of their
complaint plaintiffs alleged defendant was employed
by them under an oral contract and alleges the violation
of his duties.
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A general demurrer to this court was sustained by
the trial court and plaintiffs appealed. Defendants asserted that this court did not state a cause of action because
the oral agreement was within the Statute of Frauds.
The trial court in overruling the demurrer stated:
"The right of the Steiners to recover against
Rowley on count one of their complaint depends
upon the applicability of section 1624 of the Civil
Code to the transaction which is basis of the controversy. That statute reads: 'An agreement
authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation or
a commission * * *' is invalid unless the same, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged or by
his agent. The first count states, the Steiners
contend, a cause of action for the recovery of
secret profits made by a fiduciary. The purpose
of section 1624 of the ·Civil Code, they say, is only
to prevent a broker from recovering a commission
for services performed under an oral contract.
As Rowley received his connnission and the contract was fully executed, the form of the agreement is immaterial. Finally, they assert that there
is a fiduciary relationship between the broker
and his employer under either an oral or written
rontract, and a contrary rule would allow the
statute of frauds to be used as a cloak for fraud.
Rowley declares that because of the allegation of
an oral contract between the parties, count one
fails to state a cause of action.

"* * * Count one of the Steiners' c01nplaint
therefore states a cause of artion unless the fact
that Rowley was e1nployed under an oral contract
bars a recovery against hin1.
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"Section 1624 of the Civil Code is applicable
to the collection by the agent or broker of his
'* * * cmnpensation or a commission * * *' and
the enforcement by the principal of the broker's
agreement, (citing cases) but it has nothing to
do with the cause of action pleaded by the Steiners. They are not attempting to 'enforce' a contract Inade by Rowley. The commission has been
paid and the contract for Rowley's services fully
executed. The cause of action is one to recover
from a fiduciary his commission and secret profits,
and the general demurrer to it should have been
overruled."
POINT III.
THE DUTY OF DEFENDANTS WAS NOT BASED UPON
A VOID CONTRACT.

Under this point defendants contend that negligent
performance of a duty based upon a void contract is not
actionable. This is merely a reargument of Points I and
II under a different guise. We refer the Court to our
previous two points for our position.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF
RISK.

There can be no question about the fact that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. This being
true, the plaintiffs had the right to rely upon Defendant
Smith's representation that he had checked into the value
of the Kladis property and that the prospective trade was
to plaintiffs' advantage.
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In Richer v. Burke (Ore.) 34 P. 2d 317, which involved the exchange of properties by residents of different states, the court, in discussing the issue of reliance,
stated as follows:
"Moreover, it will be recalled that the defendant Burke was the witness' agent. It was Burke's
duty to fully and frankly inform the plaintiffs concerning this property. The plaintiffs owned no
duty to him to be on the alert lest he deceive them.
They were not bound to investigate his statements.
To the contrary, they would rightfully place confidence in any statements their agent made concerning this property. (Citing cases)".
In Burgess v. Charles A. Wing Agency, (Ore.) 11 P.
2d 811, the court stated:
"Whatever 1nay be the rule requiring investigation where the parties deal at arm's length, it
is well established that this necessitY does not exjst
where a relationship of trust or co~fidence exjsti'
between the parties so that the principal place:'
reliance upon the trustworthiness of the other."
Defendants, on page 43 of their brief, refer to an
annotation at 62 ALR 1357, 1360, as being in support of
their contention. Counsel omitted a portion of the stateInent and did not correctly include within the quotes the
important portion of the annotation. The correct statement is as follows:
••Jn the absence of special circumstances giving the princrpal a right to rely on the a.gent's
skill and care. the principal has been held to be
barred frOin recovering for the agent's negligence
by contributory negligence."
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In the case at bar plaintiffs questioned defendant concerning the value of the Kladis property. Defendant
Smith elected to withhold facts and instead gave an opinion "It looks like a good deal to me." (R. 109). In view
of the fiduciary relationship plaintiff was under no duty
to cross examine or investigate this statement.
The jury found that defendants breached their duty
of full disclosure and that as a result of this violation
plaintiffs entered into a real estate transaction which
caused them to suffer damages. This finding was abundantly supported by the evidence.
The authorities cited by defendants are not in point.
For example, the Cole case involved an action between
a buyer and seller, not a real estate agent and his client.
Plaintiff could only be found contributory negligent
or to have assumed the risks of the transaction if he had
no right to rely on the representations of his fiduciary.
The authorities are uniform that under the circumstances
of this case a fiduciary relationship existed and that plaintiff did have a right to rely on said representations. The
undisputed evidence is that he relied on said representations to his detriment. Therefore, there was and could be
no issue of contributory negligence or assumption of risk
in this case, and the trial court was correct in so holding.
POINT V.
THE EX·CHANGE AGREEMENT DID NOT WAIVE THE
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.

In the memorandum decision the trial court stated as
follows:
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"Point II
"The defendants argued that the motion
should be granted because upon the signing of the
exchange agreement, the plaintiffs waived claims
against the realtor. The matter being submitted to
the jury on the theory that the defendants failed
to disclose an opinion as to the value of the property in Idaho, presented an action on which a claim
could not be waived by contract, and on thi~
ground the motions are denied." (R. 75)
The defendants, on page 45 of their brief, after referring to the above comment contend that the failure
to disclose an opinion is fraud and the court must have
had in mind that a waiver of an action for negligence is
contrary to public policy. Counsel then cites authorities
for this proposition.
We submit that the language used by the trial court
is a sufficient response to counsel's argument.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE
JURY THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE.

Plaintiffs' original c01nplaint was based upon an allegation of fraud and 1nisrepresentation. The complaint
was amended to allege negligence as a second cause of
action which was the only issue presented to the jury.
Dis1nissal of the first cause of action was not an
abandonment of plaintiffs' only tenable position. The
evidenrP disclosed defendants breached their fiduciary
dut~r to disclose valuable inforn1ation to plaintiff. The
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evidence further disclosed that defendants, as real estate
agents, failed to use their skill and knowledge before
expressing an opinion to their client. All of this conduct
on behalf of defendants was based upon a written agreement between the parties.
It is immaterial whether this conduct by defendants
is termed fraud or negligence because it is obviously a
failure of defendants to perform their legal duty. A label
cannot change the quality or characteristics of the product.
POINT VII.
THE PROOF WAS SUFFICIENT AS TO THE PLAINTIFF
PATSY SMITH.

The plaintiffs' home which was listed with the Jackson Realty Company for sale was owned jointly by the
plaintiff vVilliam A. Smith and Patsy Smith, his wife.
The evidence reveals that William A. Smith dealt with
defendants and with KJadis for himself and for his wife
as well. Defendants offered no rebuttal evidence as to
Patsy Smith's rights. But they now undertake to inject
this hypertechnical contention into the case to confuse
the issues. We will leave it to this court's good judgment
whether to sustain the verdict in favor of William A.
Smith alone or in favor of both plaintiffs. The end result would be identical.
POINT VIII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS THE AMOUNT OF REAL ESTATE COMMISSION.
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The trial court properly directed the jury to include
as damages the cornmission paid on this transaction.
Defendants argue the commission was paid to
Fletcher-Lucas Investment Company but the evidence discloses that the commission was paid pursuant to plaintiffs' Sales Agency Agreement.
In Reich v. Chrvstopulos, 123 U. 137, 266 P. 2d 238,
the court stated:
"In undertaking the sale of the property for
the Reiches, Hill had a duty to represent their interest in good faith, to discharge it with reasonable
skill and diligence and to disclose to them all pertinent facts which would materially affect their
interest. As is noted in American Jurisprudence,
( 4 Am. Jur. 1067, Brokers, Sec. 1-!:2):
" 'The faithful discharge of his duties is a
condition precedent to any recovery upon the part
of a broker for the services he has rendered hi~
principal. Thus, he is not entitled to compensation
if he fails to disclose to his principal any personal
knowledge which he possesses relative to n1atters
which are or may be n1aterial to his employer's
interests * * *.' "
In Baird v. Madsen (Cal.) 13-! P. 2d 885, the court
stated:
"It is doubtless true, as pointed out by defendant, that a real estate broker n1ust act in good
faith in the discharge of his duties as agent; that
hy misconduct, breach of conduct or wilful disregard, in a material respect. of an obligation imposed upon him by the law of agency he nmy forfeit his right to con1pensation. (Citing cases). To
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this end it is held that the rule which applies to
trustees generally governs the relationship between a real estate broker and his principal. The
broker is bound to disclose to the principal any
facts known to him which are material to the transaction, and if he takes part in the negotiations he
is bound to exercise his skill for the benefit of his
principal; and any concealment from the principal of material facts known to the agent, or any
collusion by the latter with a purchaser may operate to forfeit the right of the agent to compensation for his services (Citing cases), and it matters
not that there was no fraud meditated and no injury done. The rule is not intended to be remedial
of actual wrong, but preventative of the possibility
of it. (Citing cases) Applying the foregoing legal
principles to the findings on this issue, it would
seem that the trial court was not unwarranted in
giving judgment for the defendant."
See 8 A.J. Sec. 1-12, 13-! ALR 1346, and Reese v.
Harper, 329 P. 2d -!10.
The evidence establishes in this case that defendants
forfeited their rights to receive any compensation for
their services when they failed to discharge the duties of
their employrnent. We submit that the better authorities
all support our position on this issue.
The case cited by defendants involved a statute peculiar to the State of California and is not controlling in
this case.
POINT IX.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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The granting of a motion for a new trial is within the
discretion of the trial court. This court in Trimble et ux
v. Union Pacific Stages, 142 P. 2d 674, 677, discussed the
circumstances under which so-called newly-discovered
evidence will be considered sufficient to require the
granting of a motion for a new trial. The court stated:
"Nor do we believe that the lower court erred
in refusing to grant a new trial. The evidence
of witnesses Hess and Halahan \\·as cumulative,
and it is well settled in this state that such evidence is not ground for a new trial. Klopenstine
v. Hays, 20 l~tah 45, 57 P. 712, 714, wherein it is
said: 'It is well settled that, to entitle a defeated
party to a new trial on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence, it must appear, (1) that he
used reasonable diligence to discover and produce
at the forn1er trial the newly-discovered evidence,
and that his failure to do so was not the result of
his own negligence; (2) that the newly-discovered
evidence is not simply cun1ulatiYe; (3) that such
evidence is not sufficient if it simply be to impeach
an adverse witness; ( 4) it 1nust be material to the
issues, and so important as to satisfy the court.
by reasonable inference, that the verdict or judgment would have been different had the newlydiscovered evidence been introduced at the former
trial; ( 5) that the defeated party had no opportunity to make the defense, or was prevented from
doing so by unavoidable accident. or the fraud or
improper conduct of the other party, without fault
on his part.' " (Citing cases)
In the case at bar the proposed newly-discovered
evidence pertained to written letters and counter-offers
in the custody of Fletcher-Lucas Inveshnent Company.
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Defendants argue that the documents are of such
a character that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the Motion for a New Trial. They contend the
documents would have an affect upon the verdict because
they would substantiate the testimony of defendants and
impeach the testi1nony of plaintiff. Plaintiffs contend
that these documents are not newly-discovered evidence
as defined in the rule of the Trimble case for the following
reasons:

First, there is no showing that defendants used
reasonable diligence to discover and produce the newlydiscovered evidence. The affidavit of the witness Baird
(R. 67) discloses that the evidence was in his office but
he was unable to locate it for the trial. If counsel felt
these documents were of such great importance he should
have requested a continuance. He did not elect this
remedy and we submit that because his choice was erroneous he cannot claim relief from this court by contending
that the evidence was newly discovered. Second, the
documents are merely cumulative. Defendant Smith testified that in his opinion the trip to Lava Hot Springs was
on the 18th day of December rather than December 8,
1950, and immediately after the trip plaintiff requested
him to make a counter-proposal for the Kladis property.
In his brief counsel argues that these documents would
substantiate this testimony by Defendant Smith. We
submit this argument establishes the fact that the evidence is merely cumulative. Third, this evidence is simply
for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff. Counsel states
that this evidence would alter the testimony of plaintiff
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pertaining to the date of the trip to Lava Hot Springs anti
the question as to whether counter-proposals were submitted by him. We submit that this argument shows
that one of the main purposes for its introduction is simply to impeach an adverse witness. Fourth, that the trial
court was not satisfied by reasonable inference that if
these documents had been presented at the time of trial
the verdict would have been different.
In the memorandum decision of the court the following is stated pertaining to his point:
"POINT ·vii.
"A 1notion was made for a new trial on the
ground that newly discovered evidence would indicate that the plaintiffs signed an agreement on
the night they returned from Lava Hot Springs,
which indicated that the plaintiffs had decided
to make the exchange without waiting for the
opinion of any Idaho residents. The ease may
still be presented to the jury on the theory that
the plaintiffs had decided to go through with the
exchange, but would have been stopped in the
procedure if they had learned of the opinion of
Bishop Teeples in Idaho.
"On this point the Court is of the opinion that
the plaintiffs would be very 1nuch weaker, and is
of the opinion that the plaintiffs testified they did
not sign any documents on the evening of the return from Lava Hot Springs.
"This point may justify the granting of the
n1otion for a new trial. The Court, ho,vever, understood that counsel would investigate further as to
the nature of the docu1nents, and the evidence
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presented with reference to the absence thereof,
and the ·Court would like to hear additional argument upon this point at the convenience of counsel."
We submit that this statement substantiates the
position of plaintiff as to the materiality and effect of
these documents. Furthermore, it indicates that the
trial court was not at all satisfied with the showing of
defendants on the issue of whether due diligence had been
exercised in obtaining these documents for the trial. As
a matter of fact, the docuinents were not newly discovered
at all because defendants had known of their existence all
the time. The same diligence exercised before the trial
that was exercised after the trial would unquestionably
have resulted in their production. The primary issue as
outlined by the court is whether defendants related to
plaintiffs the information secured by him from the witness Teeples. These documents would have no effect
upon that issue.
The documents now claimed to be newly-discovered
would not alter the fact that defendant agreed to determine the value of the Kladis property. This conclusion
is apparent regardless of the date the defendant agreed
that he would make the investigation for plaintiffs. The
documents now claimed to be newly-discovered evidence
do not alter the effect of whether defendant after contacting the witness Teeples related the entire substance of
his conversation with him to the plaintiffs. At the trial
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the plaintiff testified he did not receive this information and defendant testified that he did give the information to plaintiffs. The jury was the sole judge of the
credibility of these witnesses and these documents would
not affect this decision.
Counsel argues that these documents would have
affected the credibility of Plaintiff Smith but we submit
this contention is purely speculative. The trial court
in denying the motion for a new trial has held otherwise.
The instructions contained in group four of the
Special Verdict concerned the issue as to whether plaintiffs received the information before executing the Exchange Agreement. We contend, as the trial court ruled,
that these so-called newly-discovered documents would
have had no effect upon the jury in their deliberation
on this important point of the Special Y erdict.
In considering further statements contained in defendants' brief counsel states that these documents would
substantiate the position of defendant S1nith that he was
making the inquiry to the witness Teeples as an accmpmodation to plaintiff and that plaintiff Smith did not rely
on the report.
Again, it is our position that the obtaining of the
information was not an accon1n1odation but a duty imposed upon defendants in exercising the reasonable skill
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and diligence common in their profession. The statement
by counsel that these documents would prove by a pre~

ponderance of the evidence that plaintiff did not rely on
the report is without merit. The record now before this
Court is full of statements by both Defendants that Defendant Smith did not convey the information he secured.
This testimony was not believed by the jury and the
assumption by counsel that these documents would alter
this finding is without merit. We submit that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
SU~1~IARY

AND CONCLUSION

This case was nothing more than an action against
a real estate agent for violating the duties of his employment.
The action was predicated on the theory that defendants as real estate agents and brokers had the duty under
the circumstances of this case to determine the reasonable
value of property located in the State of Idaho. The defendants in discharging this responsibility failed to use
the reasonable skill and diligence common to their profession. As a result of their failure plaintiffs exchanged
property correctly valued at $19,200.00, subject to a $7,500.00 mortgage, for property in Idaho, incorrectly valued
at $15,500.00, but whose actual value was between $7,000.00 and $8,000.00. The jury correctly found plaintiffs'
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damage to be $3,700.00, plus $1,150.00 real estate commission, or a total damage of $4,850.00.
We respectfully submit that the trial court, in denying defendants' Motion for a New Trial and Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict was proper and in accordance with the instructions given and the damage proven
at the trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RA\YLIXGS, \YALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondents

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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